Walker v. Oregon Travel Information Council

To be protected from wrongful-discharge due to whistleblowing, one must have had “an objectively reasonable belief” that the conduct violated some law or regulation so as to make the conduct an important public-duty. Love v. Polk County Fire District, 209 Or App 474, 492, 149 P3d 199 (2006). Mere disagreements about practices and procedures that don’t actually violate the law are not protected by this public-duty exception. Id. at 493-94.

Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s rejection of her statutory whistleblowing claim, and Defendant cross-appealed a jury verdict awarding Plaintiff damages for common-law wrongful discharge. Plaintiff assigned error to the trial court’s rejection of her statutory whistleblowing claim. Defendant assigned error to the trial court's decision to allow the common-law wrongful discharge claim to be decided by a jury. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court should not have “reexamined the jury’s findings on…[the] common-law claim.” Walker v. State, 299 Or App 432, 449 (2019). On cross-appeal, Defendant argued Plaintiff’s argument at trial, that she was wrongfully-discharged for fulfilling a public-duty, was a question of law, not fact, and, therefore, should not have been tried by a jury. To be protected from wrongful-discharge due to whistleblowing, one must have had “an objectively reasonable belief” that the conduct violated some law or regulation so as to make the conduct an important public-duty. Love v. Polk County Fire District, 209 Or App 474, 492, 149 P3d 199 (2006). Mere disagreements about practices and procedures that don’t actually violate the law are not protected by this public-duty exception. Id. at 493-94. The Court held that, because it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to oversee the very things that she reported, it was not objectively reasonable for her to believe that Defendant was violating the law; therefore, Plaintiff was not fulfilling a public-duty that could exempt her from being discharged under either common-law wrongful discharge or statutory whistleblowing. Thus, the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the common-law claim and, subsequently, did not err in rejecting Plaintiff’s statutory whistleblowing claim.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.