State v. Chisholm

Under ORS 161.155, Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another, "A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person constituting a crime if: .... (2) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime the person: .... (b) Aids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the crime."

Defendant appealed her conviction for Third-Degree Assault for her role in a planned robbery. Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State’s evidence was insufficient to make a showing that she was involved or intended to be involved in the physical attack on the security guard who carried the money. In response, the State argued two points, with regards to ORS 161.155 section (2), to explain defendant’s involvement in the assault: (1) Because defendant admitted her plans to aid and abet the robbery she also concedes that she aided in the assault on the security guard; (2) Because defendant aided and abetted the robbery she also was necessarily involved in the plan to use physical attack on the armed security guard.  “Accomplice liability under the statute [ORS 161.155] exists only for the crime that a defendant intended to promote or facilitate, and not for any additional crimes that may have resulted as the natural and probable consequence of that crime.” State v. Lopez-Minjarez, 350 Or 576, 260 P3d 439 (2011). The Court held that the State had the burden of proving it was Defendant’s specific intent to aid in some capacity in the assault of the armed security guard. Therefore, because the State was unable to produce such evidence that the robbery plan involved discussion of the use of pepper spray to injure the security guard, the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Conviction for assault in the third-degree reversed; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.