State v. Pryor

ORS 161.085(7) states that “‘Intentionally’ or ‘with intent,’ when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described.” ORS 161.085(7).

Defendant appealed his conviction of ORS 163.185(1), first-degree assault. Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s jury instruction that the State did not show that defendant intended the seriousness of the injury that resulted from his action, but that he had acted intentionally in committing his actions. Relying on State v. Peacock, on appeal, Defendant argued that the court erred in instructing the jury that they needed only to find that the defendant intended to assault the victim, which resulted in serious physical injury. State v. Peacock, 75 Or App 217, 706 P2d 982 (1985). In response, the State argued for the Court to overrule Peacockbecause it was “plainly wrong” when decided, particularly after the State v. Barnes holding. State v. Barnes 329 Or 327, 986 P2d 1160 (1999). Moreover, the State argues that the seriousness of the injury is not a material element that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. ORS 161.085(7) states that “‘Intentionally’ or ‘with intent,’ when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described.” ORS 161.085(7). The Court held that Peacock was correctly decided within a scheme of statutes that classify assault in its various forms based on one or more variables including the defendant's culpable mental state, the effect of the assault on the victim, and the circumstances of the offense. Reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.