Siragusa and Siragusa

"Provisions of a stipulated dissolution agreement, although approved by the court and incorporation into a dissolution judgment, are interpreted in accordance with principles of contract construction," McDonnal and McDonnal, 293 Or. 772, 780, 652 P.2d 1247, 1251 (1982), "taking into consideration the intent of the parties, the circumstances under which it was made, and the entire instrument." Waterman v. Armstrong, 291 Or. 551, 558, 633 P.2d 774, 778 (1981).

Wife appealed from the supplemental judgment, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the dissolution judgment. Wife argued that the dissolution judgment is an equalizing judgment, and that the “Property Settlement” provision requires husband to pay her $50,000 upon the sale of the property, no matter who sells the property or whether any profits result from the sale. In response, husband argues that the dissolution judgment does not contain an equalizing judgment and instead contains a provision of payment to wife only in the event that husband sold the property at some profit. Provisions of a stipulated dissolution agreement, although approved by the court and incorporation into a dissolution judgment, are interpreted in accordance with principles of contract construction, McDonnal and McDonnal, 293 Or. 772, 780, 652 P.2d 1247, 1251 (1982), taking into consideration the intent of the parties, the circumstances under which it was made, and the entire instrument. Waterman v. Armstrong, 291 Or. 551, 558, 633 P.2d 774, 778 (1981). The Court found the trial court erred in deeming the obligation of the dissolution judgment to be satisfied; thus, the Court held that a sheriff’s sale of the property is no less a sale than a sale by husband and the equalizing payment was triggered by any sale, including the sheriff’s sale. Reversed and remanded.