Shicor v. Board of Speech Language Path. and Aud.

It is “well established that due process does not require a formal separation of the investigative functions from the adjudicative or decision-making functions of an administrative agency, nor does it preclude those who perform the latter from participating in the investigative phase.” Fritz v. OSP, 30 Or App 1117, 1121, 569 P2d 654 (1977) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 US 35, 95 S Ct 1456, 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975)).

Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final order of the Board of Speech Language Pathology and Audiology (the board) revoking her license to practice as a speech-language pathologist. Petitioner argues that the board violated her constitutional right to due process when they allowed executive director, Leybold, “to act as the primary investigator, a fact witness at trial, and the final decision maker." Petitioner asserts that the role the executive director assumed was constitutionally impermissible. Respondent asserts that even though the executive director signed the amended proposed order, she was not the final decision-maker in the case. The board chair signed the final order as an act of the entire board. It is “well established that due process does not require a formal separation of the investigative functions from the adjudicative or decision-making functions of an adminis­trative agency, nor does it preclude those who perform the latter from participating in the investigative phase.” Fritz v. OSP, 30 Or App 1117, 1121, 569 P2d 654 (1977) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 US 35, 95 S Ct 1456, 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975)). The court rejected petitioner’s contention that her due process rights were violated because the "the mere fact that Leybold performed various functions, in this case, did not violate licensee’s due process rights," and because petitioner "failed to demonstrate actual bias on the part of the board." Affirmed.