State v. Champagne

In a child sexual abuse prosecution, other-acts evidence offered to prove sexual purpose is not categorically inadmissible under OEC 404(4) merely because it involves propensity reasoning; its admissibility depends on case-specific OEC 403 balancing and measures mitigating unfair prejudice.

The State prosecuted Defendant for sexually abusing two children and introduced limited testimony that he had previously abused a third child in a similar manner. The trial court admitted the testimony under OEC 404(4) to prove Defendant’s sexual purpose and instructed the jury not to use it to determine whether Defendant committed the charged acts. After the Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration under State v. Davis, 372 Or 618, 553 P3d 1017 (2024). Defendant argued that Davis categorically required exclusion because the testimony derived its relevance from propensity reasoning. The State argued that Davis did not disturb State v. Williams, 357 Or 1, 346 P3d 455 (2015), which requires case-specific OEC 403 balancing of other-acts evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions. The Court agreed with the State and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Applying the Davis framework, the Court separated the prior abusive conduct from its context and evaluated each component’s probative value and risk of unfair prejudice. The abusive conduct was highly probative of sexual purpose, an element of the charged offenses. Although the contextual evidence carried a propensity risk and was minimally relevant, it was brief and not patently inflammatory. Because Williams permits such evidence when its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and the trial court’s limiting instructions mitigated the risk that the jury would misuse the evidence, its admission was permissible. Affirmed.