State v. Pedersen

A critical stage [of criminal proceedings] occurs when a defendant “must take steps or make a choice which is likely to have a substantial effect on the prosecution against him.” State v. Miller, 254 Or 244, 249, 458 P2d 1017 (1969).

Defendant argues for reversal of his convictions, asserting that a violation of his right to counsel occurred because arraignment is a critical stage of criminal proceedings. During the arraignment, the Defendant was asked to spell his name, an attorney was appointed for him, and his indictment charges were read to him. The state claims that Defendant failed to preserve the claim or error and that the arraignment was not at a critical stage of proceedings. Once the right to counsel attaches “the defendant has the right to counsel at all ‘critical stages’ of the prosecution… State v. Prieto-Rubio, 359 Or 16, 24, 376 P3d 255 (2016).” The Supreme Court has held that “arraignment procedures differ by jurisdiction and that what happens at such a hearing is what determines whether it is a critical stage” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 54, 82 S Ct 157, 7 L Ed 2d 114 (1961). A critical stage occurs when a defendant “must take steps or make a choice which is likely to have a substantial effect on the prosecution against him.” State v. Miller, 254 Or 244, 249, 458 P2d 1017 (1969). The Court found that Defendant failed to preserve the claim of error because he could have objected to the arraignment procedure within a reasonable time after the counsel was appointed. The Court reasoned that the arraignment was not a critical stage of the proceedings because it did not require Defendant to make any decisions or take any steps that could substantially affect the prosecution. The Court held that the arraignment created a risk of significant prejudice to the defendant’s rights that counsel could have helped prevent. Affirmed.