State v. Taylor

For crimes resulting in economic damages, the district attorney is required to present evidence of damages “at the time of sentencing or within 90 days after entry of the judgement,” but “the court may extend…[the deadline] for good cause (does not “include prosecutorial inadvertence or neglect”). ORS 137.106(1)(a); State v. Martinez, 246 Or App 383, 387, 265 P3d 92, rev den, 351 Or 507 (2011).

Defendant appealed from a judgment that required he pay restitution damages. Defendant assigned error to (1) the trial court’s determination that ORS 137.106(1)(a) does not require a restitution determination and supplemental judgment be made within 90 days of the general judgment and (2) the court’s refusal to determine whether the presentation of evidence of damages was timely. On appeal, Defendant argued that amendments made to ORS 137.106 were immaterial and still required prosecutors to present evidence of damages within 90 days of entry of judgment. Additionally, Defendant argued that reconsideration of the timeliness issue was required under the holding of State v. Aguilar-Ramos, 284 Or App 749, 395 P3d 65 (2017). Defendant argued there was no good cause because the delay was too long to be justified and the delay was caused by the State. For crimes resulting in economic damages, the district attorney is required to present evidence of damages “at the time of sentencing or within 90 days after entry of the judgment,” but “the court may extend . . . [the deadline] for good cause (does not “include prosecutorial inadvertence or neglect”). ORS 137.106(1)(a); State v. Martinez, 246 Or App 383, 387, 265 P3d 92, rev den, 351 Or 507 (2011). The Court held that, because the current version of ORS 137.106 does not specify a deadline for restitution judgments, the statutory changes were material and did not require Defendant’s restitution judgment be made within 90 days of the original judgment. The Court concluded the Aguilar-Ramos case required a reconsideration of the timeliness issue. On reconsideration, the court found there was good cause because the delay was due to court scheduling issues, not the fault of the district attorney. 

Affirmed in part, reconsidered in part.