De Young v. Brown

Under a substantial benefit theory, for a court to award attorney’s fees under its inherent equitable authority, the party seeking the award must have done so in a representative capacity either “for the benefit of…[an]… entire organization” or if to not award the seeking party would deny or inhibit equitable relief, and the action must have conferred a “substantial benefit” on others. Bova v. City of Medford, 264 Or App 763, 767, 333 P3d 1144, re den, 356 Or 574 (2014); Gilbert v. Hoisting & Port. Engrs., 237 Or 130, 142, 384 P2d 136 (1963), cert den, 376 US 963 (1964).

Plaintiff sought an award of attorney’s fees from a judgment finding that the disincorporation of the City of Damascus (“the City”) was statutorily invalid. Plaintiff assigned error to the trial court not awarding him attorney’s fees under the court’s inherent equitable authority under a substantial benefit theory. On appeal, Plaintiff argued he should be awarded attorney’s fees because he brought the suit in equity as a representative of the City’s resident’s, he prevailed in protecting both his and their rights, and he made both constitutional and statutory arguments. In response, Defendant argued that, because Plaintiff prevailed solely on the statutory argument, Plaintiff could not receive an equitable attorney fee award. Under a substantial benefit theory, for a court to award attorney’s fees under its inherent equitable authority, the party seeking the award must have done so in a representative capacity either “for the benefit of…[an]… entire organization” or if to not award the seeking party would deny or inhibit equitable relief, and the action must have conferred a “substantial benefit” on others. Bova v. City of Medford, 264 Or App 763, 767, 333 P3d 1144, re den, 356 Or 574 (2014); Gilbert v. Hoisting & Port. Engrs., 237 Or 130, 142, 384 P2d 136 (1963), cert den, 376 US 963 (1964). The Court held that, because Plaintiff was acting in a representative capacity for the City’s residents and his prevailing conferred a substantial benefit on the City, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees. Remanded for a determination of attorney fees.