State v. Schmitz

Summarized by:

  • Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
  • Area(s) of Law: Criminal Procedure
  • Date Filed: 08-28-2019
  • Case #: A164644
  • Judge(s)/Court Below: Powers, P.J. for the Court; Egan, C.J.; & James, J.
  • Full Text Opinion

Warrantless stops by police require reasonable suspicion (combination of an officer’s subjective and objective belief), by a showing of specific and articulable facts “particularized to the individual based on the individual’s own conduct”, that they had, or were about to, commit a crime. State v. Farrar, 252 Or App 256, 260, 287 P3d 1124 (2012); State v. Davis, 286 Or App 528, 532, 400 P3d 994 (2017); State v. Holdorf, 355 Or 812, 825, 333 P3d 982 (2014). An officer’s training and experience cannot contribute to the requisite particularized facts. Id. 260-62. The emergency aid exception justifies warrantless searches when there’s an “objectively reasonable belief…that a warrantless entry is necessary to” provide immediate or imminent aid. State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649, 260 P3d 476 (2011).

Defendant appealed from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine under ORS 475.894. Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence gathered from an initial stop, and subsequent search, of Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argued that, because the officer's intent was solely to determine if medical aid was needed, the initial stop was unjustified because the officer was speculating that Defendant needed help. Defendant further argued the extended stop was unjustified because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion. In response, the State argued the initial stop was justified by the emergency aid exception. The State also argued the extended stop was justified because the officer's subjective belief that Defendant possessed methamphetamine was also objectively reasonable based on the officer's observations of Defendant’s behavior, in additiona to the officer's training and experience. Warrantless stops by police require reasonable suspicion (combination of an officer’s subjective and objective belief), by a showing of specific and articulable facts “particularized to the individual based on the individual’s own conduct”, that they had, or were about to, commit a crime. State v. Farrar, 252 Or App 256, 260, 287 P3d 1124 (2012); State v. Davis, 286 Or App 528, 532, 400 P3d 994 (2017); State v. Holdorf, 355 Or 812, 825, 333 P3d 982 (2014). An officer’s training and experience cannot contribute to the requisite particularized facts. Id. 260-62. The emergency aid exception justifies warrantless searches when there’s an “objectively reasonable belief…that a warrantless entry is necessary to” provide immediate or imminent aid. State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649, 260 P3d 476 (2011). The Court held that the initial stop was justified by the emergency aid exception because there was observational evidence that Defendant needed medical assistance. The Court also held the extension of that stop was unjustified because the officer's observation of Defendant’s behavior, in addition to his training and experience, were not enough to create reasonable suspicion. 

Reversed and remanded.

Advanced Search


Back to Top