Halladay v. Board of Parole

“For offenders who committed their offenses between May 19, 1988 and April 4, 1990, it would violate the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws for the board to rely on information other than a psychological evaluation in determining whether an offender’s parole release date should be deferred on the ground that the offender had a present severe emotional disturbance that made the offender dangerous to the health or safety of the community.” Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260, 980 P2d 178, rev dismissed, 329 Or 553 (1999).

On administrative rule review, Petitioner challenged sections (2) and (3) of OAR 255-060-0012, which governs the use of psychiatric and psychological evaluations by the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision in assessing whether to postpone an inmate's parole release date. Petitioner argued that section (3) is invalid because it violates the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws for the board to rely on information other than the psychiatric/psychological evaluations in determining whether or not to postpone offender's parole release date. In response, the board argued that the rules in effect at the time of petitioner’s crime are what govern its release date deferral decisions, not the current version of OAR 255-060-0012(3). “For offenders who committed their offenses between May 19, 1988 and April 4, 1990, it would violate the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws for the board to rely on information other than a psychological evaluation in determining whether an offender’s parole release date should be deferred on the ground that the offender had a present severe emotional disturbance that made the offender dangerous to the health or safety of the community.” Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260, 980 P2d 178, rev dismissed, 329 Or 553 (1999). The Court found that the rule directs the board to consider information in addition to psychological or psychiatric evaluations for those offenders who committed their crimes from May 19, 1988, through October 31, 1989. Therefore, the Court held that the rule is invalid because the rule conflicts with the ex post facto ruling. OAR 255-060-0012(2) and (3) are invalid on their face.