Reeves v. Nooth

Under ORS 138.530(1), “a court must grant petitioner post-conviction relief if he established, ‘more likely than not,’ that he is actually innocent of a conviction in the challenged judgment.” To meet the ‘more likely than not’ standard, a petitioner must “persuade the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 US 298, 327, 115 S Ct 851, 130 LEd 2d 808 (1995).

Petitioner appealed from a judgment that granted the Superintendent’s motion and dismissed Petitioner’s actual innocence claim for post-conviction relief. Petitioner assigned error to the trial court’s determination to dismiss his actual innocence claim. On appeal, Petitioner argued that new evidence, an affidavit by a codefendant, that he obtained showed he was innocent of some of the previous charges he had been convicted of. Additionally, Petitioner argued the “extraordinarily high” standard the court used was “improper at this stage in the proceeding.” In response, the Superintendent argued that Petitioner’s actual innocence claim is barred because the evidence he was attempting to present had always been available to him and he should have raised that ground for relief sooner instead of waiting after that limitation period expired. Additionally, the Superintendent argued that even if Petitioner had a basis for post-conviction relief, Petitioner did not meet the “extraordinarily high” standard required to challenge a conviction based on new evidence of actual innocence. Under ORS 138.530(1), “a court must grant petitioner post-conviction relief if he established, more likely than not, that he is actually innocent of a conviction in the challenged judgment.” To meet the ‘more likely than not’ standard, a petitioner must “persuade the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 US 298, 327, 115 S Ct 851, 130 LEd 2d 808 (1995). The Court concluded that even when the allegations and evidence were viewed in “light most favorable to petitioner,” it was still legally insufficient for an actual innocence claim, especially when most of that new evidence was an affidavit by a codefendant.

Affirmed.