State v. Hardges

“It is a familiar rule that the meaning of words in a statute may be clarified . . . by reference to other words in the same sentence or provision.” Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering Inc., 359 Or 694, 702, 375 P3d 463 (2016). Here, when reviewing the language of ORS 137.540(1)(m), “the state acknowledges that the text . . . ‘report as required and abide by the direction of the supervising officer’ suggest that the type of ‘direction’ it authorizes probation officers to impose – and that the court may enforce through probation violation proceedings – ‘should generally relate to a probationer’s reporting requirements.’”

Defendant appealed from two judgments by the trial court which revoked Defendant’s probation and imposed a total of 31 months in prison followed by 36 months’ post-prison supervision. Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s finding that Defendant had violated the general condition of his probation which required him to report and “abide by the direction of the supervising officer.” On appeal, Defendant argued that the action plan that required him to stay at the Medford Building, which was created by his probation officer, was not a required court-ordered condition and as such, Defendant did not violate that condition. In response, the State argued that the probation officer’s “carefully drawn directions” about where Defendant was to reside and on what terms were appropriate “direction” under ORS 137.540(1)(m) because it facilitated the “reporting requirement;” that Defendant was required to live in a controlled setting and was subject to the strict rules of conduct. “It is a familiar rule that the meaning of words in a statute may be clarified . . . by reference to other words in the same sentence or provision.” Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering Inc., 359 Or 694, 702, 375 P3d 463 (2016). Here, when reviewing the language of ORS 137.540(1)(m), “the state acknowledged that the text . . . ‘report as required and abide by the direction of the supervising officer’ suggest that the type of ‘direction’ it authorizes probation officers to impose – and that the court may enforce through probation violation proceedings – ‘should generally relate to a probationer’s reporting requirements.’” The Court held that Defendant did not violate his general probation because the requirement imposed on Defendant to reside at the Medford Building was not enforceable under ORS 137.540(1)(m). Reversed and remanded.