State v. Ibarra
“In order to meaningfully ‘oppose’ such a motion under ORS 138.225, an appellant must file a response explaining why the arguments in the opening brief do present a substantial question of law, to the end that the state should file a briefed and the appeal be orally argued.” State v. Ibarra, 293 Or. App. 268, 272 (2018).
Area(s) of Law:- Appellate Procedure
Miller v. SAIF
In determining whether an employee should be compensated under a work-related injury, the court should review the evidence and if, “when, the medical evidence identifies a condition causing the claimant’s symptoms and established that the condition developed gradually over time, the claimant has not experienced an injury, and the claim must be analyzed as an occupation disease.” Jewell v. SAIF, 291 Or App 703, 705, . . . P3d . . . (2018).
Area(s) of Law:- Workers Compensation
Patterson and Patterson
In order to modify an award of spousal support, the court must determine that there has been a “substantial, unanticipated change in economic circumstances since the original award” with the other party carrying the burden of proof. Boni and Boni, 208 Or App 592 (2006).
Area(s) of Law:- Family Law
State v. Golden
A trial court error is "plain" if "(1) the error is one of law, (2) the error is obvious, not reasonably in dispute, and (3) the error appears on the face of the record, so that we need not go outside the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences, and the facts constituting the error are irrefutable." State v. Zolotoff, 275 Or App 384, 397, 365 P3d 131 (2015).
Area(s) of Law:- Sentencing
State v. Iseli
“A declarant’s hearsay statements are admissible against a party ‘who engaged in, directed or otherwise participated in wrongful conduct that was intended to cause the declarant to be unavailable as a witness, and did cause the declarant to be unavailable.’” OEC 804(3)(g); see State v. Supanchick, 354 Or 737, 766, 323 P3d 231 (2014).
Area(s) of Law:- Evidence
State v. Kelley
“When a party objects to the admission of other acts evidence, a trial court first should determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant for one or more non-propensity purposes, under OEC 404(3). Then the court should determine, at step two, whether the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under OEC 403.” State v. Baughman, 361 Or 386, 388-90, 393 P3d 1132 (2017).
Area(s) of Law:- Evidence
State v. Meeker
In determining whether an officer’s objective belief is reasonable, we look at “the totality of the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the officer at the time” that must be based on “facts specific to the particular person” and cannot be based on “intuition or a generalized fear that the person may pose a threat to the officer’s safety.” State v. Jackson, 190 Or App 194 (2003), rev den, 337 Or 182 (2004).
Area(s) of Law:- Criminal Procedure
State v. Richen
Based on York v. Bailey, 159 Or App 341, 347-48, 976 P2d 1181, rev den, 329 Or 287 (1999), modification of a judgment on a basis of evidentiary error requires affirmatively established prejudice in the record; without that record, no reversal will occur.
Area(s) of Law:- Criminal Procedure
State v. White
Evidence of other abuse is not per se propensity evidence and may be relevant for a nonpropensity purpose depending on the facts and circumstances in a given case.
Area(s) of Law:- Evidence
State v. White
“Evidence of other, uncharged abuse can be probative of the reasons for delayed reporting of the charged conduct: ‘The repeated association between the pursuer and the pursued may be directly relevant to demonstrate why [a] victim failed to complain about the initial sex act once the pursuer stopped pestering her. [A] victim may be properly allowed to testify to facts from which a jury could infer reasons for the delayed reporting.’” State v. Zybach, 308 Or. 96, 100, 775 P.2d 318 (1989).
Area(s) of Law:- Evidence
Velasco v. State of Oregon
In determining whether a defendant has been convicted of a criminal offense, the court should look for “four distinct events: (1) defendant’s act of pleading guilty or a jury’s act in reporting a verdict of guilty; (2) acceptance by the trial judge of the guilty plea or verdict; (3) conviction of the defendant on the plea or verdict; and (4) pronouncement and entry of defendant’s sentence.” State v. McDonnell, 306 Or 579, 581-82, 761 P2d 921 (1988).
Area(s) of Law:- Post-Conviction Relief
Busch v. McInnis Waste Systems, Inc.
In determining whether the court should apply ORS 31.710(1), the court should consider “the nature of plaintiff’s injuries, the lack of any quid pro quo in ORS 31.710(1), and our conclusion [in Vasquez] that ‘the legislature’s reason for enacting the noneconomic damages cap . . . cannot bear the weight of the dramatic reduction in noneconomic damages that the statute requires for the most grievously injured plaintiffs,’ reducing plaintiffs’ noneconomic damages awards to $500,000 would leave them without a ‘substantial’ remedy as required by Article I, section 10.” Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 288 Or App 503, 406 P3d 225 (2017), rev allowed, 362 Or 665 (2018).
Area(s) of Law:- Remedies
Dahlke v. Jubie
“Parties opposing summary judgment have the burden of producing evidence that creates a material issue of fact as to those issues, but only to those issues.” Two Two v. Fujitec America, Inc., 355 Or. 319, 326, 325 P.3d 707 (2014). “That means that issues not ‘raised in the motion’ are not properly before the trial court on summary judgment.” Eklof v. Steward, 360 Or. 717, 731, 385 P.3d 1074 (2016).
Area(s) of Law:- Civil Procedure
Nevins v. Board of Parole
Under ORS 183.482(8)(c), the court may set aside or remand orders that are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, based on a reasonable person standard.
Area(s) of Law:- Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
Sachdev v. Oregon Medical Board
The board must comply with the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act, ORS 677.200, and requires the board to provide the licensee with a notice under the Fourteenth Amendment. Murphy v. Oregon Medical Board, 270 Or App 621, 622, 348 P3d 1173 (2015). ORS 184.415(3)(c) requires the board to provide a “’reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved’” in the allegations.
Area(s) of Law:- Administrative Law
State v. Balabon
"Under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within 'one of the few "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement.'"
Area(s) of Law:- Criminal Procedure
State v. Bowden
ORS 137.540(2) allows the imposition of special conditions “that are supplementary to the general conditions available under ORS 137.540(1)” and it is not intended as a way to override a general condition. State v. Schwab, 95 Or App 593 (1989)
Area(s) of Law:- Sentencing
State v. C.H.
Under ORS 425.275(4), the county in which the trial visit occurred has sole jurisdiction over all proceedings stemming from the visit.
Area(s) of Law:- Civil Procedure
State v. Garrett
In deciding whether an instruction is coercive, the court reviews the words to determine whether it: “(1) encourages the minority of the jury to reconsider its views in light of the majority’s position; (2) is not balanced by an emphasis on adhering to conscientiously held opinions; (3) refers to the necessity or expense of a retrial; and, most of all, (4) informs the jury that it has an obligation to continue deliberating until it reaches a verdict or that the court will not declare a mistrial as the result of a deadlocked jury.” State v. Marsh, 260 Or 416, 443, 490 P2d 491 (1971), cert den, 406 US 974 (1972).
Area(s) of Law:- Criminal Law
State v. Holt
OEC 404(4) requires trial courts to conduct balancing under OEC 403 rather than a “narrower, ‘due process’ standard for evaluating the admissibility of evidence.” State v. Baughman, 361 Or 386, 393 P3d 1132 (2017).
Area(s) of Law:- Evidence
State v. S.-Q. K.
“Adjudicatory hearings”, according to the legislative history, were intended to be a “one shot” disposition, meaning that one “could not first give one disposition and later give another for the same act, stating a range of possible dispositions are available to the court upon the first try and the court just has to choose the right one so it “encompasses a juvenile court probation violation hearing”. DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736 (2016).
Area(s) of Law:- Juvenile Law
State v. Villalta
A court cannot impose fees based on pure speculation that a defendant has funds to pay for the fees or may acquire them in the future.” State v. Pendergrapht, 251 Or App 630, 634, 284 P3d 573 (2012). The state has the burden of proving the defendant’s ability to pay. State v. Kanuch, 231 Or App 20, 24, 217 P3d 1082 (2009).
Area(s) of Law:- Attorney Fees
State v. Mayo
"To admit evidence under OEC 412, a trial court must conduct a three-step inquiry;" first, determine if the evidence concerns past sexual behavior of the victims, second, determine whether the evidence is offered in the form of an opinion or reputation evidence, and third, balance the probative value with the prejudicial effects.
Area(s) of Law:- Criminal Law
State v. Thomas
A trial court properly orders a defendant to pay attorney fees “where the defendant himself has posted a security deposit subject to the express condition that the monies could be used to satisfy the defendant’s financial obligations.” State v. Twitty, 85 Or App 98, 106, 735 P2d 1252, rev den, 304 Or 56 (1987).
Area(s) of Law:- Sentencing
Tanner and Tanner
For purposes of calculating child support, OAR 137-050-0710 requires a determination of each parent’s income. OAR 137-050-0715 defines ‘[actual] income’ as . . . a parent’s gross earnings and income from any source, including sources listed in section (4).” OAR 137-050-0715(2).
Area(s) of Law:- Family Law
Bayview Loan Servicing v. Chandler & Newville
When deciding whether a party is entitled to pursue foreclosure in order to resolve another party’s interest, previous court’s have held, “where a first mortgagee acquires the mortgagor’s interest, the first mortgage does not merge with it so as to elevate the second mortgage to a position of a first and only mortgage. See W.J. Seufert Land Co v. Greenfield, 273 Or 408, 412, 541 P2d 814 (1975).
Area(s) of Law:- Property Law
Conte v. City of Eugene
In determining the sufficiency of an appearance, “a person need not assert a position on the merits of the proposed land use action. A bare, neutral appearance, such as a letter requesting that the local government accept the letter as an appearance and provide notice of the decision, is sufficient. Nonetheless, the person must, at a minimum, submit a document . . . that the local government would reasonably recognize as an appearance by that person.” Century Properties, LLC v. City of Corvallis, 51 Or LUBA 572, 586, aff’d, 207 Or App 8, 139 P3d 990 (2006).
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Department of Human Services v. J.H.
Under ORS 419B.100(1)(c), the juvenile court may assert jurisdiction only where the evidence is sufficient to establish “a current threat of serious loss or injury that is likely to be realized” which is to be based on “the totality of the children’s circumstances or conditions.” Dept. of Human Services v. A. W., 276 Or App 276 (2016). Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391 (2015)
Area(s) of Law:- Juvenile Law
Department of Human Services v. T.L.H.S.
When it comes to a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court’s focus must be “on the child’s conditions or circumstances at the time of the hearing and whether the totality of those circumstances demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of harm to the welfare of the child.” Dept. of Human Services v. W. A. C., 263 Or App 382 (2014)
Area(s) of Law:- Juvenile Law
Kailash Ecovillage, LLC v. Santiago
“Under ORS 90.155(1), a landlord is permitted to use nail and mail service only if the parties’ rental agreement affords the tenant a ‘reciprocal right’ to use nail and mail service.” American Property Management Corporation v. Nikaia, 230 Or. App. 321, 328, 215 P.3d 906 (2009).
Area(s) of Law:- Landlord Tenant
Kay v. Employment Dept.
Under ORS 657.176(2)(c), an individual who “voluntarily left work without good cause” is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. “Good cause for voluntarily leaving work under ORS 657.176(2)(c) is such that a reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense, would leave work.” OAR 471-030-0038(4).
Area(s) of Law:- Employment Law
Lizama v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Ins. Co.
Under ORS 742.061(1), "a plaintiff in an action on an insurance policy is generally entitled to attorney fees if 'the plaintiff's recovery exceeds the amount of any tender made by the defendant,'" unless the insurer has accepted coverage in a small subset of situations or if the insurer has consented to submit the case to binding arbitration.
Area(s) of Law:- Insurance Law
Mason v. BCK
Summary judgment is appropriate if undisputed facts would compel a jury to return a verdict for the moving party.” Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 414, 939 P2d 608 (1997).
Area(s) of Law:- Civil Procedure
Meyer v. Oregon Lottery
“A government employer ‘can violate its employees’ rights to privacy and intimate association either by impermissibly investigation their private sexual conduct or by taking adverse employment action on the basis of such private conduct.’” Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 857 (9th Cir. 2018).
Area(s) of Law:- Employment Law
Slaughter and Harris
The Supreme court has a two-step determination for a chance of custody. Since the original judgment or custody/parenting time order, capacity of the moving party or legal custodian’s ability to take care of the child has changed and it would be in the child’s best interest, upon review of the relevant evidence, that custody be changed. The moving party has the burden of proving the change of circumstance. Boldt and Boldt, 344 Or 1, 9, 176 P3d 388 (2008).
Area(s) of Law:- Family Law
State v. Wakefield
Under ORS 163.195(1), reckless endangerment occurs when a defendant’s actions put another person within the “zone of danger” of a weapon or projectile. State v. Harbert, 155 Or App 137, 963 P2d 710, rev den, 327 Or 554 (1998).
Area(s) of Law:- Criminal Law