State v. Bales

“A person who has received formal training in prehospital and emergency care, and is licensed to attend any person who is ill or injured or who has a disability. Police officers, firefighters, funeral home employees and other persons serving in a dual capacity one of which meets the definition of ‘emergency medical services provider’ are ‘emergency medical services providers’ within the meaning of this chapter.” ORS 682.025(4).

Defendant appealed a judgment of conviction for one count of third-degree assault of an emergency medical service provider, ORS 163.165(1)(g), and one count of second-degree criminal mischief, ORS 164.354(1)(b). On appeal, Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal based on his argument that the victim (an emergency room nurse) was not an “emergency medical service provider” within the meaning of ORS 163.165(1)(g) and ORS 682.025. The state responded that the legislature intended a broad interpretation of the term “emergency medical service provider” as to include emergency room nurses and thus, the trial court did not err. “A person who has received formal training in prehospital and emergency care, and is licensed to attend any person who is ill or injured or who has a disability. Police officers, firefighters, funeral home employees and other persons serving in a dual capacity one of which meets the definition of ‘emergency medical services provider’ are ‘emergency medical services providers’ within the meaning of this chapter.” ORS 682.025(4). The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant and found that the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 682.0254(4) did not support the state’s broad interpretation of “emergency medical services provider” as to include an emergency room nurse. Reversed and remanded.