State v. Simrin

ORS 137.225(1)(b) provides in part, that if charges of a crime are dismissed or the person is acquitted, the “arrested person may apply to the court . . . for entry of an order setting aside the record of arrest.”

Defendant-Appellant, Simrin, appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside his arrest for contempt. Simrin assigned error to the trial court’s determination that ORS 137.225(1)(b) did not apply and the arrest for contempt could not be set aside. On appeal, Simrin argued that his dismissed charge for contempt should be set aside under ORS 137.225(1)(b) because the arrest record demonstrated he was arrested and charged with a crime. The State countered that because contempt in not a crime, his record may not be set aside under the statute. ORS 137.225(1)(b) provides in part, that if charges of a crime are dismissed or the person is acquitted, the “arrested person may apply to the court . . . for entry of an order setting aside the record of arrest.” The Court of Appeals determined the statute’s text, context, and legislative history did not indicate the intent to limit the meaning of “crimes” to exclude people who have been charged with a crime that is not actually a crime. The Court held that the trial court erred because the statute applies to “any arrest” in order to allow a person arrested but not convicted of a crime the ability to “clear the past and remove the stigma of accusation.” Reversed and remanded for entry of an order setting aside defendant’s record of arrest pursuant to ORS 137.225(1)(b).