State v. McClure

Taking a person into custody for a parole violation constitutes an "arrest" for the purposes of the resisting arrest statute, ORS 162.315.

Defendant appealed a conviction of resisting arrest under ORS 162.315. Officers attempted to take Defendant into custody pursuant to an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The State charged Defendant with one count of resisting arrest and a jury convicted him. On appeal, Defendant argued two assignments of error: (1) the court’s admission of evidence related to a prior conviction of resisting arrest, and (2) the court’s denial of motion for judgment of acquittal. The Court rejected the first assignment of error without discussion. Regarding the second, Defendant argued that ORS 162.315 does not apply when a person is taken into custody for a parole violation because a parole violation is neither a crime nor a violation. Thus, it does not fall within the definition of “arrest” in ORS 133.005(1). The State agreed that a parole violation is neither a crime nor a violation, but argued that a departure from the standard definition of “arrest” is necessary in certain circumstances. The Court agreed and relied on legislative history and intent to conclude that ORS 162.315 applies because a person taken into custody for a parole violation constitutes an “arrest” for the purposes of ORS 162.315. Affirmed.