State v. Turner

Under State v. Glushko/Little, failure to appear does not equal the defendant's consent to a delay for the purposes of ORS 135.747. The Court may also look to the cause of the delay in determining whether the Defendant was brought to trial in a reasonable amount of time.

Defendant appealed a judgment of conviction on grounds that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Approximately eight years and four months lapsed between the initial charge and the Defendant's hearing on her speedy trial motion. The trial court found that the Defendant consented to a large portion of the delay by failing to appear in court. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in determining that she consented to this portion of the delay. Additionally, Defendant argued she was not brought to trial within a reasonable time under ORS 135.747. The Court agreed with the Defendant, and has previously held that failure to appear does not constitute consent to the delay. However, the cause of delay is still taken into account to determine whether the Defendant was not brought to trial within a reasonable amount of time. The Court held that the Defendant's failure to appear resulted in reasonable delays. The Defendant was aware of the pending charge and was under an obligation to update the court of any address changes. The trial court properly denied Defendant's motion. Affirmed.