Treadway et al v. Jefferson County

When read together, the language in JCZO 301.6(J)(4) and JCZO 301.6(J)(2), pertaining to temporary medical hardship dwellings, suggests a temporal nexus that requires that a permanent dwelling must exist on the property “at such time as” (or “when”) “the hardship ends” and that the permanent dwelling must be removed within three months after the hardship ends.

A single-wide mobile home has been located on EFU property since it was placed there in 1987 after the county approved its placement as a temporary medical hardship dwelling. Prior to the date of approval, the property also included a double-wide mobile home. At some point the double-wide mobile home was removed from the property, but the single-wide mobile home remained on the property. The medical hardship need expired sometime after 1987, and the single-wide mobile home has not been used as a residence for several years. In October 2014, James Bachman and Julie Bachman, intervenors-respondents, applied to replace the single-wide mobile home with a new double-wide manufactured dwelling. The planning director approved the application, and Brent Treadway and Gary Zuber, petitioners here, appealed the decision to the planning commission. The planning commission reversed the planning director’s decision and denied the application. The Bachmans appealed the decision to the board of commissioners, which reversed the planning commission and approved the application prompting this appeal to LUBA.

Treadway and Zuber first argued that the evidence in the record established that the double-wide mobile home was not present on the property when the temporary medical hardship dwelling was approved and placed on the property, and that therefore the county’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, and that the single-wide mobile home continued to be a temporary medical hardship dwelling that, under the first sentence of JCZO 301.6(J)(4), is not eligible for a replacement dwelling. LUBA denied the first assignment of error and noted that the argument was undeveloped and did not point to any inconsistencies in statutory language; therefore, the petitioner had not met their burden of demonstrating reversible error. Additionally, the second and third assignments could not point to reversible error. The county decision was AFFIRMED.