Harrison v. City of Cannon Beach
Pursuant to Cannon Beach Municipal Code (CBMC) 17.40.020(A)(1), “[p]lanned residential development . . . shall include not less than three acres of contiguous land, unless the planning commission finds that property of less than three acres is suitable by virtue of its unique character, topography or other natural features, or by virtue of its qualifying as an isolated problem area” and where a proposed planned development is shown to possess “unique topography” it may qualify for a “degree of flexibility” consistent with the purposes of the planned development provisions of CBMC 16.04.310.
Area(s) of Law:- Municipal Law
Sage Equities LLC v. City of Portland
Under Fasano v. Washington County, 264 Or 574 (1973), a petitioner is entitled to an opportunity to respond to new evidence, and where a local government introduces evidence that represents a new issue, a petitioner must be given an opportunity to address the new issue before the local government makes a decision based thereupon; nevertheless, even if a local government makes a decision without giving a petitioner opportunity to address the new issue, such a procedural error requires remand under OAR 661-010-0071(2) rather than reversal under ORS 197.835(10)(a)(A).
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
King v. Clackamas County
Pursuant to OAR 660-004-0020(2)(c), a local government is not required to evaluate specific alternative sites for a proposed use unless parties identify specific alternative sites and provide evidence that developing those sites with the proposed use would have significantly fewer adverse impacts than the originally proposed site.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Kovash v. Columbia County
In Davis v. City of Bandon, 19 Or LUBA 327, 336 (1991), LUBA explained that before existing development ordinances and regulations are suspended by way of a moratorium, they must be shown to be inadequate. ORS 197.520(3)(a)(A), (b)(A). Moreover, for a moratorium to be valid—even if the ordinances and regulations are inadequate—alternative methods of achieving the objectives of the moratorium must be unsatisfactory. ORS 197.520(3)(a)(C), (b)(C).
Area(s) of Law:- Municipal Law
Treadway et al v. Jefferson County
When read together, the language in JCZO 301.6(J)(4) and JCZO 301.6(J)(2), pertaining to temporary medical hardship dwellings, suggests a temporal nexus that requires that a permanent dwelling must exist on the property “at such time as” (or “when”) “the hardship ends” and that the permanent dwelling must be removed within three months after the hardship ends.
Area(s) of Law:- Municipal Law
Bishop et al v. Deschutes County
A local government's decision is excluded from the definition of a "land use decision" under ORS 197.015(10)(a) if the decision requires future land use review pursuant to ORS 197.015(10)(b)(H)(iii).
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Space Age Fuel, Inc. v. Umatilla County
Under ORS 197.835(11)(b), LUBA may overlook a local government’s “defective” findings if a party can identify evidence that “clearly supports” the local government’s decision or part of the decision.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use