Dept. of Human Services v. G. O.

“[T]he key inquiry in determining whether conditions or circumstances warrant jurisdiction is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood of harm to the welfare of the child.” Dept. of Human Services v. C.Z., 236 Or App 436, 440 (2010). “The risk of physical violence to a child under one year of age is a threat of serious harm that supports juvenile court jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. T. J., 302 Or App 531, 538-39, (2020).

After an incident of domestic violence of Father toward Mother while Father was holding the couple’s newborn child (IO), DHS asserted, and the juvenile court granted, a protective custody and dependency petition of IO in favor of DHS. DHS’s court filing occurred after Mother returned to the couple’s shared apartment with IO after a 29-day stay in a domestic violence center. The juvenile court took jurisdiction over IO on two bases: that mother was unable to protect IO from exposure to father’s domestic violence; and that Father had not successfully engaged in treatment for his violent conduct. On appeal, mother argued that DHS did not provide sufficient evidence of a nexus between the father’s violent conduct and harm to IO; that DHS did not meet its burden to establish the “type, degree, and duration” of the harm to IO in sufficient particularity; and that DHS did not establish that IO was at risk of any current serious harm. “[T]he key inquiry in determining whether conditions or circumstances warrant jurisdiction is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood of harm to the welfare of the child.” Dept. of Human Services v. C.Z., 236 Or App 436, 440 (2010). “The risk of physical violence to a child under one year of age is a threat of serious harm that supports juvenile court jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. T. J., 302 Or App 531, 538-39, (2020). The Court reasoned that father’s documented history of physical violence, coupled with his years-long delay in completing his program and “demonstrated willingness to place IO in the middle of his physical confrontation” provided a nexus between his conduct and the risk of harm to IO; that father’s willingness to place IO “in such close proximity to their parents fighting so as to be endangered by it” provided evidence of a “nonspeculative and reasonably likely risk that IO would be injured during a future incident of physical violence by father”; and that IO’s age, and mother’s inability or unwillingness to fully appreciate the risks posed to IO by father’s behavior, demonstrated there was a current non-speculative risk of serious harm to IO. Thus, the Court held the juvenile court did not err in asserting jurisdiction over IO. Affirmed.