Peeler v. Reyes

Under federal law, “absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents … a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” Brady v. United States, 397 US 742, 756-57 (1970).

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief stemming from convictions of kidnapping, rape, and sodomy in 2007, which was denied by the post-conviction court. Petitioner appealed, arguing that his guilty pleas on those charges were not made “knowingly” because he was unaware that the U.S. Supreme Court would later hold non-unanimous jury verdicts an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), and that the Oregon Supreme Court would apply Ramos retroactively in Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or 604 (2022). At the time of his guilty pleas, Article I, Section 11 of the Oregon Constitution stated that in state criminal cases, “ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict.” Respondent argued that “the question whether a defendant knowingly waived a federal constitutional right is measured at the point in time that he or she pled guilty.” Under federal law, “absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents … a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” Brady v. United States, 397 US 742, 756-57 (1970). The Court reasoned Petitioner was accurately advised by the trial court of the scope of his Sixth Amendment rights as they existed at the time he entered his guilty pleas, and that the trial court would have misrepresented the law regarding jury unanimity under the Oregon Constitution had it informed Petitioner “that only a unanimous jury could find him guilty if he elected to go to trial in 2007.” The Court held that Petitioner thus knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial at the time he entered his guilty pleas. Affirmed.