State v. Craig

Convictions for felony sex crimes must result in a sentence to count towards a defendant’s eligibility for life without parole under ORS 137.719(1). Gordon v. Hall, 232 Or App 174, 221 P3d 763 (2009).

Defendant appealed his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for first degree rape.  Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s authorization of enhanced sentences when a defendant “has been sentenced” for felony sex crimes at least two times before under ORS 137.719(1).  On appeal, Defendant argued that his first sex crime in 1981 should not have counted as one of the times for an enhanced sentence, because he was placed on probation, which was not considered a sentence in 1981.  In response, the State asserted that because the 1981 trial court suspended execution of Defendant’s sentence, rather than suspending imposition of sentence, Defendant had been sentenced in 1981.  Convictions for felony sex crimes must result in a sentence to count towards a defendant’s eligibility for life without parole under ORS 137.719(1).  Gordon v. Hall, 232 Or App 174, 221 P3d 763 (2009).  The Court determined that, under the version of ORS 137.010(5) in effect in 1981, there was a difference between suspending “the imposition or execution of sentence” and imposing a sentence.  Therefore, the Court found that Defendant was not sentenced when the 1981 trial court placed him on probation after suspending execution of sentence.  Thus, the Court held that Defendant’s 1981 conviction did not count “towards an enhanced sentence under ORS 137.719(1).”  Reversed and remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.