Criminal Justice Reform Clinic v. Board of Parole

OAR 255-032-0005(4) and (5) allow for the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor and, therefore, do not facially violate the Eighth Amendment. ORS 161.620 does not require that the board rules mandate immediate parole eligibility for juveniles. Engweiler v. Board of Parole, 343 Or. 536, 548, 175 P.3d 408 (2007) (Engweiler I).

Petitioner challenged the validity of OAR 255-032-0005(4) and (5), also known as the JAM-II rules. Petitioner contended that the two rules, which govern parole consideration for juveniles convicted of aggravated murder between 1989 and 1995, violate the Eighth Amendment, the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions, and ORS 161.620. Petitioner's Eighth Amendment challenge relied on the contention that the rules use an "adult matrix" that treats youth as an aggravating factor instead of a mitigating one. Petitioner’s ORS 161.620 challenge rested on the contention that the JAM-II rules do not provide for immediate parole eligibility, and its ex post facto challenge contended that the rules impose minimum incarceration terms where none existed and increased the requisite time served before becoming parole eligible. In response, the State argued that youth is viewed as a mitigating factor. OAR 255-032-0005(4) and (5) allow for the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor and, therefore, do not facially violate the Eighth Amendment. ORS 161.620 does not require that the board rules mandate immediate parole eligibility for juveniles. Engweiler v. Board of Parole, 343 Or. 536, 548, 175 P.3d 408 (2007) (Engweiler I). The Court reasoned that Petitioner's challenge was too narrow and, at its core, challenged possible ramifications of the JAM-II rules. OAR 255-032-0005(4), (5) held valid.