United States v. Herrold

Whether a state offense that criminalizes continued unpermitted presence in a dwelling following the formation of intent to commit a crime has “the basic elements of unlawful * * * remaining in * * * a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime,” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990), thereby qualifying as “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Respondent was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) for unlawful possession of a firearm. The State sought increased sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) because Respondent was previously convicted on two burglary charges and possession of a controlled substance under state law. Respondent argued that the Texas statute for burglary was indivisible and broader than the definition of generic burglary under federal law and therefore did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The district court rejected Respondent’s argument. On rehearing after several appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held for Respondent. It found the Texas statute did not have a sufficient intent requirement and that the state interpretation of remaining in a dwelling was broader than the federal definition. Petitioner argues that the court erred in its interpretation that the generic burglary definition requires an intent to commit a crime at the moment of entry or remaining without authorization. The United States Supreme Court recently held in Quarles v. United States that the intent to commit a crime may form at any time to constitute a generic burglary. 587 U.S. ___ (2019). In light of the Court’s holding that state law need only substantially correspond or be narrower than that of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), the court of appeals decision is vacated and the case is remanded.