Gundy v. United States

Whether, under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Congress has unconstitutionally delegated its lawmaking power to the Attorney General, who pursuant to this act, may determine when SORNA applies to offenders convicted before its enactment.

Petitioner was charged with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) “for traveling in interstate commerce” while failing to meet the deadline to register as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). The Petitioner argued that his only interstate movement occurred while he was in federal custody and that at the time of his movement, he was not yet “required to register.” The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that Petitioner’s custody while traveling did not create an exemption from registration. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but limited review to Petitioner’s fourth question presented. Petitioner asks the Court to determine whether Congress has improperly assigned its own lawmaking authority to the Attorney General, breaching the Constitutional requirement for the separation of governmental powers. Petitioner argues that the enactment of SORNA is improper due to a provision granting authority to the Attorney General to “specify the applicability of the requirements” to offenders convicted before SORNA’s enactment. Petitioner argues that Congress impermissibly failed to provide guidance to the Attorney General on how this delegated authority should be exercised. Petition for WRIT of CERTIORARI GRANTED.