Manrique v. United States

Should Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) allow for the ripening of premature notices of appeal in criminal matters, filed after sentencing judgments but before entry of deferred restitution judgments, after the final judgment is entered?

Petitioner pled guilty to possession of material involving a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Petitioner was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay mandatory restitution in an amount to be determined at a later time. Following the court’s judgment, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. While Petitioner’s appeal was pending, the district court entered a second final judgment that mirrored the first final judgment, except that the amount of restitution was stated. Both parties addressed the sentence and the amount of restitution in their briefs on appeal, but the Eleventh Circuit decided sua sponte that, absent a notice of appeal by Petitioner challenging the second final judgment, the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue. Petitioner brought this appeal, arguing that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) allows for premature notice of appeals in criminal cases filed after sentencing to mature after the entry of deferred restitution judgments. Petitioner posits that eight other circuits already support this interpretation of Rule 4(b) (2) and that a decision is necessary to resolve the remaining circuit splits. Petitioner further argues that Courts of Appeals already have jurisdiction over premature notices of appeal pursuant to existing case law that determined that timeliness of an appeal in criminal matters is not significant for jurisdiction.