Pakdel v. City and County of San Francisco

The Supreme Court held that Respondent’s requirement to "execute the lifetime lease" was a final agency action and that the government action constituted "an actual, concrete injury," and "administrative 'exhaustion of state remedies was not a prerequisite for a takings claim when the government has reached a conclusive position.

Petitioners partially owned a multiunit residential building in San Francisco, which was organized as a tenancy-in-common at the time the interest in the property was purchased.  Respondent, the City, allowed for the conversion of tenancy-in-common interests so long as the owners seeking conversion submitted a filing fee and met several conditions, such as non-occupant owners that rent their property unit must offer the current tenant a lifetime lease.  Petitioner requested that Respondent excuse the lifetime lease or compensate them for the lease.  After Respondent denied both requests, Petitioner filed suit in federal court and alleged an unconstitutional regulatory taking. During Petitioner’s appeal, the Supreme Court repudiated the previous case law regarding seeking compensation in state court first. The Supreme Court held that Respondent’s requirement to "execute the lifetime lease" was a final agency action and that the government action constituted "an actual, concrete injury," and "administrative 'exhaustion of state remedies was not a prerequisite for a takings claim when the government has reached a conclusive position." Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 2). The Court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit had no right to affirm the dismissal and regulate Petitioner’s claim due to the constitutional ripeness.  Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.