Johnson v. City of Philomath
(1) Where an opponent argues before a local government that an application is incomplete, but does not argue that a particular state statute prohibits the local government from processing incomplete applications, the opponent may not raise compliance with the state statute for the first time on appeal to LUBA. (2) Where a party argues before a local government that a staff report was available only five days before a hearing, but does not argue that a particular local code provision requires the local government to provide staff reports seven days prior to the hearing, the party may not raise compliance with the local code provision for the first time on appeal to LUBA.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Tugaw v. Jackson County
Where a local code provision which implements state law contains different language from state law, but where the local government interprets the local code provision as identical to state law without interpreting the different language, LUBA will apply its own prior interpretations of the state law at issue where the local government offers no analysis supporting a different conclusion.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Jones v. Clackamas County
(1) A local government errs in relying on a later enacted local code provision to interpret the effect of a previous quasi-judicial decision. (2) In making a statutory permit decision under ORS 215.416(8)(a), a local government errs in basing its decision on a previous quasi-judicial decision that has not been adopted by ordinance or regulation.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Jones v. Clackamas County
(1) Where a local code provision requires individualized notice to property owners only when an application “relates to . . . a specific property,” the fact that the application referred to a proposed use at a specific street address, that the owner of that specific property signed the application, and that the application had a causal connection with and was the impetus for the local government’s decision is sufficient to establish that the application “relates to . . . a specific property” and that individualized notice was required, even where the local government’s decision applies to all property in a particular zone and does not examine any particular development proposal or the characteristics of any individual property. (2) Where a local code provision precludes a local government from processing an application “if the specific question raised . . . has already been decided through another land use permit application,” a local government does not err by processing an application for a similar use determination even though it previously denied a conditional use permit with which the similar use determination has some features in common.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Van Dyke v. Yamhill County
(1) Where the only evidence that a county will use a proposed bridge for “fire control” is an affidavit that the bridge is designed to serve large fire vehicles, and where the construction agreement describes the bridge as part of a larger recreation trail, a county errs by concluding the bridge is a “[f]ire service facilit[y]” allowed outright under ORS 215.283(1)(s), rather than a transportation facility requiring conditional use approval under a local code provision. (2) A conditional use must secure land use approval prior to construction, regardless of whether the improvements will be used for conditional use purposes until land use approval is later obtained.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use