- Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
- Area(s) of Law: Evidence
- Date Filed: 10-09-2024
- Case #: A180236
- Judge(s)/Court Below: Pagán, J. for the Court; Shorr, P.J.; & Mooney, J.
- Full Text Opinion
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants, ORS 813.010(4) after entering a conditional plea. On appeal, Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his (1) motion to exclude his refusal to consent to a breath test and (2) motion to exclude blood evidence. Defendant contended his statements regarding the breath test should be suppressed because the officer’s line of questioning was ambiguous. Defendant further argued the blood evidence merited suppression because it violated his due process rights to admit the evidence when it was not collected by a phlebotomist who met qualifications under ORS 813.160(2). The State conceded that although the officer’s questions to Defendant about his willingness to take a breath test were ambiguous this required a more narrow suppression of evidence than Defendant asserted. Regarding the blood evidence, the State pointed to ORS 136.432 and State v. Warner, 181 Or App 622, 47 P3d 497 (2002) prevents suppression of blood test results because the terms of ORS 813.160(2) are not met. A person’s refusal to waive their constitutional right to not consent to a warrantless search is not admissible at trial as evidence of the person’s guilt. State v.Banks, 364 Or 332, 342, 434 P3d 361 (2019). “ORS 136.432 does not allow courts to suppress evidence whose sole taint is that it was obtained in violation of a statutory provision.” State v. Warner, 181 Or App 622, 631-32, 47 P3d 497 (2002). The Court found the officer’s questioning was ambiguous and therefore held the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his refusal to consent to a breath test. The Court additionally found ORS 136.432(1) did not prohibit Defendant from contesting the admission of blood evidence if it was obtained in an unsafe manner or by methods that might cause contamination. Thus, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the blood evidence because Defendant’s due process rights were not implicated by the admission of the evidence under ORS 136.432. REVERSED AND REMANDED.