State v. Johnson

Stalking occurs if a person “knowingly alarms or coerces another person or a member of that person’s immediate family or household by engaging in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person; [i]t is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim’s situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and [t]he repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim’s immediate family or household.” ORS 163.732(1)(a)-(c). Under State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 303 (1999), a qualifying threat must “instill[] in the addressee a fear of imminent and serious personal violence from the speaker.”

Appellant was convicted for stalking (ORS 163.732) and telephonic harassment (ORS 166.090) which stemmed from a series of threatening text messages, calls, and emails sent from Appellant to his ex-girlfriend, J, and a neighbor, M, along with other harassing conduct. On appeal, Appellant assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA). Appellant argued the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate his conduct constituted a sufficiently imminent threat to J, and that M experienced subjective fear resulting from the conduct. Stalking occurs if a person “knowingly alarms or coerces another person or a member of that person’s immediate family or household by engaging in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person; [i]t is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim’s situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and [t]he repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim’s immediate family or household.” ORS 163.732(1)(a)-(c). Under State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 303 (1999), a qualifying threat must “instill[] in the addressee a fear of imminent and serious personal violence from the speaker.” The Court rejected Appellant’s arguments, finding that because the evidence demonstrated that Appellant “was willing to use extensive and illegal means to find information about J,” and that M’s testimony, coupled with his prior requests for police protection, permitted an inference that he “subjectively feared imminent and serious personal violence,” Appellant’s conduct was sufficient to meet the imminent threat and subjective fear standards established in Rangel. Affirmed.