State v. Moore

A defendant is guilty of second-degree disorderly conduct under ORS 166.025(1)(d) as long as there is a risk of causing public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. State v. Hund, 76 Or App 89, 91-92, 708 P2d 621 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 477 (1986).

Defendant was convicted of interfering with a peace officer, harassment, and second-degree disorderly conduct. Defendant made two assignments of error, arguing that 1) his MJOA for the disorderly conduct charge should have been granted because the State failed to prove he was “obstructing traffic” and 2) the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must agree on what conduct constitutes interference with a peace officer. 

ORS 166.025(1)(d) provides that a person is guilty of second degree disorderly conduct if they “[...]recklessly[...]obstruc[t] vehicular or pedestrian traffic on a public way.” Defendant argued that the statute requires there be traffic present and that the perpetrator significantly block or impede the flow of vehicular traffic. The Court found that the word “obstructs” in the plain meaning of the statute requires only a risk of causing public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to be “sufficient to justify the jury’s verdict.” State v. Hund, 76 Or App 89, 91-92, 708 P2d 621 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 477 (1986). The Court held that a reasonable factfinder could find that the Defendant met that requirement. 

The Court summarily rejected the second assignment of error as harmless. 

AFFIRMED.