State v. Villeda

“Actual bias is a question of fact to be determined by the court from all of the circumstances, including the prospective juror’s demeanor, apparent intelligence, and candor during voir dire.” State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 74 (2000). “The fact that a prospective juror has formed opinions about matters relevant to the case is not itself cause to exclude that juror based upon actual bias.” Id. “[R]ehabilitation [of a biased prospective juror] occurs with evidence sufficient to allow the trial court to find that the juror has an unqualified and unequivocal commitment to serving fairly and without bias.” State v. Carter, 205 Or App 460, (2006).

Defendant appealed two convictions: 1) endangering a person protected by an order under the Family Abuse Prevention Act and 2) fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence.  At trial, the court dismissed Defendant’s for-cause challenge of a prospective juror who had repeatedly expressed bias in favor the victim. On appeal, Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing a for-cause dismissal of the prospective juror, and that the trial court’s error was prejudicial because he was forced to use one of his six preemptory challenges to exclude the prospective juror, which he would have otherwise directed toward a different prospective juror. “Actual bias is a question of fact to be determined by the court from all of the circumstances, including the prospective juror’s demeanor, apparent intelligence, and candor during voir dire.” State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 74 (2000). “The fact that a prospective juror has formed opinions about matters relevant to the case is not itself cause to exclude that juror based upon actual bias.” Id. “[R]ehabilitation [of a biased prospective juror] occurs with evidence sufficient to allow the trial court to find that the juror has an unqualified and unequivocal commitment to serving fairly and without bias.” State v. Carter, 205 Or App 460, (2006). The Court reasoned the attempts to rehabilitate the potential juror’s repeated expressed bias through questioning, while “focused generally on her ability to be fair and impartial and to consider the evidence and law," did not specifically focus on the source of the bias, and thus yielded insufficient evidence to prove that rehabilitation established the juror’s ability to do so unequivocally. Therefore, the Court held the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting Defendant’s for-cause challenge. The Court also concluded that prejudice is presumed in a denial of a preemptory challenge when “the defendant makes a record that a lost preemptory challenge would otherwise have been used against a juror who sat” based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in State Highway Commission v. Walker et ux, 232 Or 478 (1962). Reversed and remanded.