State v. Cage

An officer has authority to stop a person if they "reasonably suspect - based on specific articulable facts - that the person committed a specific crime or type of crime or was about to commit a specific crime or type of crime." (quoting, State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 316 Or 163, 182 (2017). Reasonable suspicion cannot be established from evidence acquired after a stop. State vl. Ellis, 252 Or App 382, 389 (2012). When relying solely on a 9-1-1 report, the report must have an “indicia of reliability.” State v. Villegas-Varela, 132 Or App 112, 115 (1994.)

Defendant appealed his conviction of menacing, unlawful use of a weapon with a firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant assigns error to denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant rugged that officers lacked a  reasonable suspicion to seize him based on evidence gathered in a 9-1-1 report and they failed to establish specific and articulable reasons. The State argued Defendant was lawfully based on a reasonable suspicion from the totality of the circumstances. An officer has authority to stop a person if they "reasonably suspect - based on specific articulable facts - that the person committed a specific crime or type of crime or was about to commit a specific crime or type of crime." (quoting, State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 316 Or 163, 182 (2017). Reasonable suspicion cannot be established from evidence acquired after a stop. State vl. Ellis, 252 Or App 382, 389 (2012). When relying solely on a 9-1-1 report, the report must have an “indicia of reliability.” State v. Villegas-Varela, 132 Or App 112, 115 (1994.) The Court held the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The Court reasoned based on three factors from State v. Mitchele, to determine the report’s reliability; “whether the informant is exposed to possible criminal and civil prosecution if the report is false,” “whether the report is based on the personal observations of the informant,” and “whether the officer’s own observations corroborated the informant’s information.” 240 Or App 86, 92-93 (2010). The Court found the first factor to be neutral and of little importance to the analysis and the second and third not met. REVERSED AND REMANDED