Justice v. Vercher

Summarized by:

  • Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
  • Area(s) of Law: Standing
  • Date Filed: 08-31-2022
  • Case #: A169933
  • Judge(s)/Court Below: Ortega, P.J., for the Court, Shorr, J. & Powers, J.
  • Full Text Opinion

The courts will reconsider a common-law rule or doctrine when (1) “an earlier case was inadequately considered or wrong when it was decided,” (2) “surrounding statutory law or regulations have altered some essential legal element assumed in the earlier case,” or (3) “the earlier rule was grounded in and tailored to specific factual conditions and some essential factual assumptions of the rule have changed.” G. L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54, 59 (1988).

Vercher pleaded guilty to first-degree animal neglect after surrendering her underfed and emaciated horse, Justice, to Sound Equine Options (SEO). Mosiman, SEO’s executive director, filed a complaint against Vercher for negligence per se with Justice as the named plaintiff. The trial court granted Vercher’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Justice lacked legal capacity to sue. Mosiman assigned error to the trial court’s motion to dismiss, arguing the Court should modify Oregon common law to recognize animals protected under Oregon’s animal welfare statutes as legal entities capable of bearing and exercising their own rights. The courts will reconsider a common-law rule or doctrine when (1) “an earlier case was inadequately considered or wrong when it was decided,” (2) “surrounding statutory law or regulations have altered some essential legal element assumed in the earlier case,” or (3) “the earlier rule was grounded in and tailored to specific factual conditions and some essential factual assumptions of the rule have changed.” G. L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54, 59 (1988). The Court determined that only human beings and legal entities may sue under Oregon common law, and that there was no reason to depart from this doctrine. The Court reasoned that animals lack self-determination and the ability to express their wishes in a way the legal system would recognize, and that a person purporting to represent an animal’s interest would necessarily project an assumed interest onto that animal and act upon legal fiction. Affirmed.

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