Harned v. Amsberry

As stated in Jones v. Mississippi, in sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, “a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” After Jones, so long as the court is allowed to consider relevant mitigating circumstances and has the discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life without parole, no more is required.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder after killing a seven-year-old girl when he was 16 years old. At his sentencing hearing, and in accordance with ORS 163.150 (1997). The court considered “Petitioner’s youth, difficult home life, a history of physical and psychological abuse by his parents since infancy, sexual abuse at the hands of a registered sex offender, low intelligence, and mental health issues.” The State presented rebuttal evidence—specifically that Petitioner’s behavior was “reported to be some of the worst that’s been seen in the . . . corrections facility.” Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In his post-conviction relief proceeding, Petitioner contended that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the sentencing failed to comply with Miller v. Alabama, which prohibited mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles and established that a sentencer must consider a juvenile homicide offender’s youth before imposing a life-without-parole sentence. As stated in Jones v. Mississippi, in sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, “a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” After Jones, so long as the court is allowed to consider relevant mitigating circumstances and has the discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life without parole, no more is required. The court concluded that Petitioner’s sentencing satisfied the requirements of Miller. Therefore, Petitioner’s sentencing did not violate the Eighth Amendment and the post-conviction court did not err in denying Petitioner’s claim for relief on that basis. Affirmed.