State v. Berglund

A "court's sentencing authority exists solely by virtue of a statutory grant of power and therefore cannot be exercised in any manner not specifically authorized." State v. Coventry, 290 Or App. 463, 464 (2018). However, a claim is not precluded by this rule when a proceeding for violating a condition of probation is initiated “during the probation period.” State v. Ludwig, 218 Or 483, 492 (1959).

Defendant appealed a sentencing judgement after the lower court discovered new charges. Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s revocation of his court-supervised probation and argued that the it lacked the authority to revoke his probation. Defendant reasoned that because the revocation was predicated on charges filed after the conclusion of the probation period, the court no longer had the authority. The State argued that the violation gives a sentencing court "carte blanche authority to sanction a probationer for any violation of the conditions of probation, even when the specific probation violation charge is initiated after the conclusion of probation." A "court's sentencing authority exists solely by virtue of a statutory grant of power and therefore cannot be exercised in any manner not specifically authorized." State v. Coventry, 290 Or App. 463, 464 (2018). Furthermore, a claim is not precluded by this rule when a proceeding for violating a condition of probation is initiated “during the probation period.” State v. Ludwig, 218 Or 483, 492 (1959). Because no statute granted the trial court authority, and the charges were not brought during the probation period, the trial court erred. Reversed and remanded for resentencing.