State v. Oxford

The scope of the consent defines the scope of the intrusion under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. State v. Wyman, 59 Or App 542, 545, 651 P2d 195 (1982). Consent to administer emergency aid does not necessarily give an officer consent to remain or reenter premises once that function has ceased, and consent to enter initially for one purpose does not mean that different officers can enter for a different purpose. See State v. Will, 131 Or App 498, 503, 885 P2d 715 (1994).

Defendant called the police after discovering that his roommate was suffering cardiac arrest. Upon their arrival, the officers discovered methamphetamine, a handgun, and a homemade explosive device. Defendant was charged with felon in possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of a destructive device, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized as a result of the search, arguing that the search and seizure violated Article I, section 9. Defendant was nonetheless found guilty at a bench trial. On appeal, the State asserted that defendant’s initial call “constituted consent” and that the “emergency-aid exception . . . and community caretaking provided constitutional justification for them to remain.” The scope of the consent defines the scope of the intrusion under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. State v. Wyman, 59 Or App 542, 545, 651 P2d 195 (1982). Consent to administer emergency aid does not necessarily give an officer consent to remain or reenter premises once that function has ceased, and consent to enter initially for one purpose does not mean that different officers can enter for a different purpose. See State v. Will, 131 Or App 498, 503, 885 P2d 715 (1994). The Court concluded that “the trial court erred in relying on defendant’s consent for [one officer’s] entry and remaining on the premises as consent to [other officers’] entry for criminal investigative purposes.” Reversed and remanded.