Thompson v. Portland Adventist Medical Center

“[T]o toll the limitations period, a plaintiff’s mental condition ‘must have been such as to have actually barred her from knowing that [the defendant] had harmed her.’” Gaspar v. Village Missions, 154 Or App 286, 292 (1998) (emphasis in original). The severity of a plaintiff’s mental condition to qualify for such a bar is a factual question. Roberts v. Drew, 105 Or App 251, 255 (1991).

Monica sued Portland Adventist Medical Center (Hospital) and an unknown nurse five years after the accidental suffocation of her son while they were sleeping in the same bed together.  Monica brought three claims: negligence; negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) for her; and subsequently added an NIED claim for Graham, her son’s father.  Monica appealed the trial courts grant of the Hospital’s motions for summary judgment on all claims because they were barred by statute of limitations.  Monica, Graham, and the son's estate argued reasonable factfinders could determine their claims were timely. “[T]o toll the limitations period, a plaintiff’s mental condition ‘must have been such as to have actually barred her from knowing that [the defendant] had harmed her.’” Gaspar v. Village Missions, 154 Or App 286, 292 (1998) (emphasis in original). The severity of a plaintiff’s mental condition to qualify for such a bar is a factual question. Roberts v. Drew, 105 Or App 251, 255 (1991). The Court found that there was a triable question of fact about whether state of limitations tolled because Monica may have been disabled due to a mental condition, pursuant to ORS 12.160. Thus, the Court held the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on Monica’s NIED claim because did not err on the other two claims because there was no similar exception for them. Reversed and remanded as to plaintiff Monica Thompson’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; otherwise affirmed.