State v. Alapai

Relevant circumstances when considering the efficacy of delayed Miranda warning are (1) “the nature of the violation”; (2) “the amount of time between the violation and any later statements”; (3) “whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements”; (4) “subsequent events that may have dissipated the taint of the earlier violation”; and (5) “the use that the state has made of the unwarned statements.” State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703, 716, 277 P3d 535 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence under ORS 813.010 and reckless driving under ORS 811.140 after having entered a conditional guilty plea because the lower court partially denied his motion to suppress statements made, sobriety test results, and a breath test. Defendant argued that because the lower court found the first officer on the scene violated Defendant’s Miranda rights, the statements, sobriety, and breath test made to the second officer should have been suppressed as well. The State argued that if there was any “taint” from the Miranda violation, it was sufficiently attenuated. Relevant circumstances when considering the efficacy of delayed Miranda warning are (1) “the nature of the violation”; (2) “the amount of time between the violation and any later statements”; (3) “whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements”; (4) “subsequent events that may have dissipated the taint of the earlier violation”; and (5) “the use that the state has made of the unwarned statements.” State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703, 716, 277 P3d 535 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that, considering the above, the Miranda warning was effective because there was a successful “reset” when the new officer arrived and was unaware of statements made to the first officer. Affirmed.