Ghiglieri v. Tomalak

To determine if reasonable necessity for an implied easement exists, the court is to consider “what a reasonable grantee would be justified in expecting as a part of his bargain when he purchases land under the particular circumstances.” Dressler et al v. Isaacs et al, 217 Or. 586, 598-599, 343 P.2d 714 (1959).

Tomalak appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment which stated that Ghiglieri did in fact have an implied easement over Tomalak's land. Tomalak assigned error to the trial court’s allowance of summary judgment and argued that there was a “genuine dispute of material fact” which would defeat the grant of summary judgment. Ghiglieri argued that an implied easement over Tomalak's land had been proven because the easement “is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment” of their land. To determine if reasonable necessity for an implied easement exists, the court is to consider “what a reasonable grantee would be justified in expecting as a part of his bargain when he purchases land under the particular circumstances.” Dressler et al v. Isaacs et al, 217 Or. 586, 598-599, 343 P.2d 714 (1959). The Court held that because there was no genuine dispute of material fact, summary judgment was proper. Evidence showed that there was an implied easement because proper parking and use of the garage would be expected when purchasing the land. Affirmed.