Smith v. United States

Violations of the Constitution's Venue, Vicinage, and Double Jeopardy Clauses during the course of a criminal trial in Federal court should be remedied via retrial. “[T]he appropriate remedy for prejudicial trial error, in almost all circumstances, is simply the award of a retrial, not a judgment barring reprosecution.” United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).

Petitioner Smith was convicted in Federal court of several charges, including theft of trade secrets. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the venue was improper and that the error barred retrial. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the venue had been improper but found that retrial was the proper remedy. Petitioner assigned error, arguing that retrial was a violation of the Venue Clause, Vicinage Clause, and Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. 

The Court found that “the appropriate remedy for prejudicial trial error, in almost all circumstances, is simply the award of a retrial, not a judgment barring reprosecution.” United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). Petitioner argued that violations of the Speedy Trial Clause have historically precluded retrial, and that violations of the Venue and Vicinage Clauses should also bar retrial. The Court found that violations of the Speedy Trial Clause are “generically different” from “any other criminal right in the Constitution[,]” and that text and precedent provide no basis for denying a retrial based on violations of other Constitutional rights. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). 

The Court held that retrial did not violate the Venue Clause, the Vicinage Clause, nor historical tradition and that the Double Jeopardy Clause “is not implicated by a retrial in a proper venue” when a trial terminates “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which [the defendant] is accused.”  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978). 

AFFIRMED.