Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P. S. C.

When deciding the timeliness of a third party’s motion to intervene, the most important consideration for courts is whether the party sought to intervene “as soon as it became clear” that its interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties in the case. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394 (1977).

The Kentucky Legislature passed a law which regulated an abortion procedure.  Respondents challenged this law in Federal Court.  Kentucky’s Secretary for Health and Family Services defended the law through the appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  After the secretary declined to file a petition for re-hearing en banc or for a writ of certiorari, Petitioner—Kentucky’s attorney general—filed a motion to intervene on behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.  The Sixth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion to intervene.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that Petitioner’s motion to intervene was timely because it was sought “as soon as it became clear” that Kentucky’s interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties in the case.  United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394 (1977).  The Supreme Court reasoned that, although the litigation had been going on for years, it was more important that Petitioner moved to intervene within two days of learning that the secretary would not continue to defend the law.  Further, Respondents were not unfairly prejudiced by the appeal by the attorney general, nor was there a jurisdictional issue barring the attorney general’s motion to intervene.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to intervene.  REVERSED and REMANDED.