Sessions v. Dimaya

With respect to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 18 U.S.C. §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague; in part because the similarly worded “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act was held unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), illegal aliens who are convicted of “aggravated felonies” are subject to deportation. Pertinent to the present case, an “aggravated felony” is defined as a “crime of violence” according to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Respondent has been a permanent resident in the United States since 1992 and has twice been convicted of first-degree burglary in California. The Government initiated proceedings to remove respondent after the second conviction. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals held the first-degree burglary statute in California constitutes a “crime of violence” under 16(b). During the pendency of respondent’s appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), held unconstitutional a clause similar to 16(b) within the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  In light of this decision, the Ninth Circuit held 16(b) also unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that the same interpretive doctrinal rules for vagueness should apply to each statute. Due to the dispositive reasoning in Johnson, the Court held that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment could not tolerate § 16(b) as constructed. AFFIRMED.