State v. Haltom

Mental state definitions applicable to conduct don’t just apply to particular body movements, they apply more broadly to additional elements of that nature – such as the essential character – of a prohibited act. State v. Simonov, 358 Or. 531, 540-41 (2016).

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse as defined in ORS 163.425(1)(a). Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s denial for Defendant’s request for a jury instruction that “knowingly” was the minimum mental state rather than “reckless.” On appeal, Defendant argued that for conviction under ORS 163.425(1)(a), the victim’s non-consent was considered a “conduct” element that required evidence that the Defendant had knowledge that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse. In response, the State argued that the legislative intent under ORS 163.425(1)(a) treated the victim’s non-consent through the lens of independent circumstance that required the lesser mental state of criminal negligence. Mental state definitions applicable to conduct don’t just apply to particular body movements, they apply more broadly to additional elements of that nature – such as the essential character – of a prohibited act. State v. Simonov, 358 Or. 531, 540-41 (2016). The Court held that, because the legislature intended that a victim’s non-consent to sexual intercourse that the defendant subjects them to as a requirement of the proscribed conduct, the requisite mental state was “knowingly,” the trial court erred in providing jury instructions that found Defendant guilty if he acted “negligently, recklessly, or with knowledge with respect to that element.” Reversed and remanded.