State v. Meiser

"Ordinarily, when the legislature uses different terms, we assume that the legislature intends those terms to have different meanings." Norwood v. Premo, 287 Or App 443, 451 (2017).

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Court was asked to consider whether the phrase "as a result of" in ORS 161.295(1) means that a qualifying mental disease must be sufficient on its own to render a defendant incapacitated, or whether it was the legislature's intention to require a lesser degree of contribution from the qualifying mental disease. Defendant argued that the text and context of the statute provided that the intention of the legislature was to have a lesser degree of contribution from the mental disease; however, because his qualifying mental disease was the predominant driver of his behavior, the legislature's intention was not relevant. The State argued that an "independant sufficiency" standard of causation should be used given the legislature's use of the phrase "as a result of" instead of "cause." "Ordinarily, when the legislature uses different terms, we assume that the legislature intends those terms to have different meanings." Norwood v. Premo, 287 Or App 443, 451 (2017). The Court explained that the phrase "as a result of" was not defined for purposes of the statute, therefore it looked to the plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. Taking the definitions of the words, the Court held that "as a result of" meant that the mental disease must be the reason for the defendant's lack of capacity. Affirmed.