Myers v. Owners of Certain Real Property

Where a deed provision does not expressly limit the use of adult residential facilities, or in effect allow only other types of residential uses, but instead “uniformly limits all or nearly all development of the property,” that provision is not in violation of ORS 93.270(1)(b)(B). ORS 93.272(5).

Appellant assigns error to the decision below that property restrictions on Appellee’s title, requiring her to keep portions of her land undeveloped, are in violation of ORS 93.270(1)(b)(B). Appellant argues that the provisions do not restrict use of the property from a “licensed residential facility,” they create limits on the property as to all residential development. ORS 93.270(1)(b)(B). On appeal, the Court held that where a deed provision does not expressly limit the use of adult residential facilities, or in effect allow only other types of residential uses, but instead “uniformly limits all or nearly all development of the property,” is not in violation of ORS 93.270(1)(b)(B). ORS 93.272(5). ORS 93.272(5) asks only “whether the provision . . . is in violation of ORS 93.270,” not whether the owner intends to build a licensed residential facility. ORS 93.272 provides a powerful remedy to violations of ORS 93.270: to construe impermissible restrictions as broadly as Appellee contends would make it nearly impossible to limit use or development of real property “through real estate instruments.” A narrower reading also comports with legislative intent to provide equal opportunity to people with disabilities for housing.  Reversed and remanded.