State v. Jackson

“[T]he doctrine of chances, standing alone, is insufficient to make evidence * * * relevant[,]” and requires separate linkage that does not rely on prohibited inferences to the State’s proof of a material fact.

The State commenced an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order denying their motion in limine to cross-admit evidence. On appeal, the State argued the doctrine of chances provides a theory of relevance upon which to admit evidence that Defendant’s DNA was found near the bodies of three other murdered women at similar crime scenes, without relying on impermissible character inferences. In response, Defendant argued the State failed to meet foundational requirements for their doctrine of chances argument, that the proposed evidence was not relevant, and that presenting evidence of each crime to the same jury would result in “substantial prejudice.” “[T]he doctrine of chances, standing alone, is insufficient to make evidence * * * relevant[,]” and requires separate linkage that does not rely on prohibited inferences to the State’s proof of a material fact. When limited to statistical reasoning, the Court found that the doctrine of chances does not rely on impermissible character inferences. However, the doctrine of chances is not a theory of relevance, and depending on it for relevance expands the doctrine beyond statistical reasoning. The Court reasoned that linking the doctrine of chances argument and the fact it is introduced to prove requires additional inferences which must not rely on “character-based reasoning.” The State’s articulated chain of inferences required character-based reasoning. The order of the circuit court is affirmed.