State v. Merritt

“From the fact that the legislature made arrival of the protected party a prerequisite to the enforcement of a foreign restraining order that has not been presented to a sheriff or filed in the circuit court, we infer that the legislature intended that such an order would not be enforceable absent arrival.” See ORS 24.190.

Defendant was found in contempt on 16 counts of violating a restraining order. Defendant assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the court addressed the extent to which ORS 24.190 authorizes Oregon courts to enforce restraining orders as if they were issued by Oregon courts. “From the fact that the legislature made arrival of the protected party a prerequisite to the enforcement of a foreign restraining order that has not been presented to a sheriff or filed in the circuit court, we infer that the legislature intended that such an order would not be enforceable absent arrival.” See ORS 24.190.  According to defendant, because there is no evidence that the victim ever physically came to Oregon, there is no basis to infer that she “arrived.” In response, the state contended that “arrival” can be interpreted to mean answering a phone call that was initiated in Oregon and cited methods for “appearing” in court for support. See, e.g., ORS 419C.025 (telephonic appearance statute). The court reasoned that taking the state’s approach would be at odds with established methodology for construing statutes, under which we give ordinary words their ordinary meanings. State v. Jones, 286 Or App 562, 566-67, 401 P3d 271 (2017). Moreover, the court was “unpersuaded that, because it is possible to ‘appear’ by telephone in an Oregon court, a person ‘arrives’ in Oregon merely by accepting a phone call originating in Oregon.” Because none of the statutory prerequisites to enforcement of a foreign restraining order were met, the court concluded that the trial court erred in enforcing the order. Reversed.