State v. J. R.

“‘[A]djudication’ and ‘disposition’ of the allegations are understood to refer to distinct phases of delinquency proceedings,” M. A. S., 302 Or App at 701, and that, had the legislature intended the phrase detention “before adjudication on the merits” to mean detention before both the adjudication and the disposition stages, it would not have chosen to omit the term “disposition” from ORS 419C.145. Cf. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).

Youth appealed two orders in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Youth assigned error to the juvenile court’s order continuing his detention pending disposition. Youth argued that ORS 419C.145 authorizes detention of a youth only before adjudication of the allegations, not while pending disposition. Although Youth’s issue on appeal was moot, the Court determined that it qualified for review under ORS 14.175 and addressed the issue. On appeal, Youth sought a reversal of the juvenile court’s determination that it could continue holding youth in detention after adjudication. In response, the State argued that the juvenile court did not err, because the term “adjudication” broadly applies to both the adjudication on whether Youth committed the violation as well as how the juvenile court should respond. The Court determined that “‘adjudication’ and ‘disposition’ of the allegations are understood to refer to distinct phases of delinquency proceedings,” M. A. S., 302 Or App at 701, and that, had the legislature intended the phrase detention “before adjudication on the merits” to mean detention before both the adjudication and the disposition stages, it would not have chosen to omit the term “disposition” from ORS 419C.145. Cf. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Determination that youth may be held in detention under ORS 419C.145 after adjudication reversed; otherwise affirmed.